Conceptualising football – The Game Model

Published on in Features

Stating the obvious, different teams have shown throughout time that they can reach success by using different strategies. When comparing the game model of Mourinho’s Inter Milan to the Barcelona’s of Guardiola era; the Real Madrid’s of Ancelotti to the Ajax’s of Rinus Mitchels, the only thing that these teams had in common is the number of eleven players starting every game. Therefore in first place it is important to understand what is the Game Model.

The Game Model is a useful way of organizing all the behaviours we want to implement in a team in the different moments of the game (defensive organisation, attacking organisation, defense-attack transition and attack-defense transition). Each of this phases there are the correspondent Principles, Sub Principles and Sub-Sub Principles of Play.

The principles, sub-principles and sub-sub principles, functional organisation (team dynamics) and the structural organisation (1-4-3-3,1-4-4-2, etc) are sub-products.

However in my opinion, more important than adopting and organising these principles of play with the different phases of the game, is how these principles (and its sub and sub-sub principles) are connected and articulated, because the game is a continuous flow.

This means that the way on team attacks is connected with the way one team defends and vice-versa. In other words, the moments of the game are bounded to one another. For instance, a team when in possession (attacking organisation) that looks for maximum depth and width, will compromise their attack-defense transition simply because the players are very far between them.

As a result, when possession is lost there will not be many players around the ball zone, making the recovery off the ball less likely to happen. By the same token, the opposition will have more time and space to start their own defense-attack transition.

The Game Model is an idealisation/aspiration of the coach in constant changing. In other words it is never achieved, because it is permanently being constructed and re-constructed.

Why? Because the coach itself is not static, the players are not static, the experiences lived by the coach will continuously shape his Game Model (it is not closed or absolute).This approach/perspective is influenced by cognitivist and constructivist learning theories.

The Game Model Adopted (GMA) by the coach, is also influenced by the cultural context of the club (and its resources), players’ characteristics, the coaches are different, the training process and methodologies are different, the competitions are different, the supporters are different.

It is unthinkable for an Athletic Bilbao coach to suggest to sign non-Basque players or coaching Barcelona and implement a direct style play (although Tata Martino managed to do that with awful results). For the exact same reason I think everyone agrees that it would be very difficult to ask Leicester City FC players to mimic FC Bayern Munich game model (or ‘playing stye’).

It is the coaches’ responsibility to organize and analyse the process. For example, if it is established as a Principle to adopt pressing zone when defending, then the sub and sub-sub principles need to be related (pressing references; pressing from the blind side; pressing zones and feet orientation in order to help peripheral vision), in the training exercises.

Another eternal question when discussing Game Models is its relationship with the opposition. Some coaches defend that having a Game Model implemented is the team’s identity, in other words, a team plays always the same way despite who the opposition is.

Other coaches prefer to adapt their team to the opposition week after week. In my opinion this is one of the reasons why there are so many games that are no good fun to watch. Many teams(and coaches) are more concerned with what the opposition may do than actually with what their own team may do, and their only aim is to nullify the other team at all costs (wasting time, playing with 11 behind the line of the ball-although very disorganised,etc).

However it is important to stress the fact that teams with well defined models (Bayern, Borussia,etc), they do make some changes in their strategy depending on the opposition, such as, pressing higher or lower on the pitch, but never changing their own principles.

In the future I believe the biggest challenge for coaches will be to construct a Game Model with many variables in terms of structural organisation and team dynamics, in order to become more difficult to the opponent to analyse and employ counteract strategies. Bearing in mind that teams have increasingly less time to train.

A good example of this is how Guardiola has displayed different versions of Bayern Munich, where the players occupy different positions (structure) and interact in different ways (dynamics), within the same model.

The video below shows some principles and sub principles in action:

http://videos.sapo.pt/epae8oPePzDbzFKbOZPr

by Pedro Castro

pedro castro bnw

You might be interested in

England and the long pass

It doesn’t take much watching football discussion these days to make me reach for the mute button and lament the

The importance of decision making

Published on in Features

FCBFCB12.0

Very recently I came across with an article covered here which studied and compared the effectiveness of the decision-making process of different players including Messi, Ronaldo, Robben and Xavi. Unfortunately I did not get access to the original paper from the GoodCall group, however I got the information from two different sources and therefore I am confident that a reliable evaluation about the strengths and the weaknesses of this specific method can be made.

According to Ouriel Daskal, Goodcall is a group of people working with statistical analysis who “have developed an algorithm that calculates quality and effectiveness of decisions taken by footballers”. So as for an attacking player the Efficiency Per Match (EPM) is the measure of different variables (actions) that a player takes during offensive plays resulting in goals.

In practical terms, this means that a player responsible for a goal every match has an EPM of 100. By the same token, the algorithm also claims to be able to quantify the quality of the decisions taken by measuring variables such as numbers of shots, passes, key passes, etc. Theoretically this algorithm should give us a good picture of what happens on the pitch, however in my opinion, this is not the case.

Potentially it could be a useful tool to analyse the game/actions if it were possible to break down the game into fragments. But as Carvalhal (2014, p.122) remind us “talking about moments might create the illusion to the less experienced that the fact that these moments exist, that does not necessarily means that they (moments) can be disintegrated in order to be analysed. Indeed they can and produce erroneous analysis.”

In my perspective, Carvalhal’s view (fractal) can be applied in the same way when looking at individual performance in general, or more specifically in this case the decision-making process. My argument is that it is not possible to analyse in depth the decision-making process by looking at variables such as shots on target, passes or that EPM is a reliable indicator. Let’s analyse the following situation:

image001

In this example Messi transformed a 2v2 into a 2v1 situation. If Suarez had the same (or anywhere near) game knowledge as Messi, he would understand that a simple vertical pass would leave Messi 1v1 with Neuer. So could the first pass could be considered a key pass? Definitely. What about the way the ball is controlled and received? How this can be measured? Had Suarez taken the right decision, Messi could have scored and raised his EPM or missed the shot and consequently lower his EPM.

This last consideration lead us to the next argument: decision-making cannot always be assessed only by the end product, like strikers should not be judged only by the amount the goals they score (read here). Strangely enough whilst I was writing this, I have had a conversation with a fellow coach (yesterday), who defended the opposite. On his own words “who am I to tell off a kid who scores from a difficult position when he could have passed to a teammate better positioned?”. To me this is perhaps the main reason why gifted players go through the formation ladder as hot prospects and then fail miserably to become professionals (or top players).

So why does this happens then? Let’s imagine the wonderfully gifted 12 year-old kid who is able to take on most of his opponents at his age (or even older ones), is very efficient on 1v1 or even 1v2 and sometimes 1v3 situations. His cognitive process transformed into game knowledge is more or less this: as soon as I receive the ball I’ll take on any defender who stood up for me and I will score dozens of goals and I will be the best player of my team. Over time as the player tries to do this and it is successful, the coach sees (or should see) that he takes the wrong decision most of the times. Instead of telling him in a constructive way that he should also look for other solutions for various reasons (i.e. transform his game more unpredictable, long-term development), the coach gives positive feedback and reinforces this behaviour. And I believe that the coach will do this not because he wants to damage the kid but for pure ignorance or willing to win at all cost at this stage of player development.

Fast-forwarding a few years, what do we see? Well the kid is still very gifted, but guess what? So are the other kids. What happens then? The once hot prospect is not a prospect anymore and it is struggling to even get a professional contract. Mainly because his game and consequent knowledge, is far too limited to make an impact or even to be good enough for a professional contract. Football is a game (and art) intrinsically connected to the brain of the players and performed (and unveiled) though their physical and external movements. Not acknowledging the primary role of the brain and game knowledge in a footballer (at least the very best of them) is to deny the chance of producing more players better prepared to deal with the intricacies of modern and future football.

by Pedro Castro

pedro castro bnw

You might be interested in

England and the long pass

It doesn’t take much watching football discussion these days to make me reach for the mute button and lament the

Why Guardiola is a step ahead of the rest

Published on in Opinion

pep bnw

In modern days anyone with access to technology and a bit of free time, is able to write and/or give opinions about virtually any subject (i.e. Internet forums, newspapers commentary boxes, etc). Football being probably one of the most followed subject around the globe is not therefore immune to this trend. The downfall of this, is that readers and football fans are flooded with opinions, some of them useful and well researched/documented, but the vast majority based on…the last result or preconceived ideas that the reader/fan has about a specific team/player/coach. I like to think that my reflective thoughts written here belong to the first group.

Guardiola after the first leg against FC Porto for the last 16 of the Champions League (2014/2015), was considered to be ‘the most overrated manager in history’ (you can read it here ). The answer he gave to the world, as if he needed, would come a week later (this actually has been written by me, a FC Porto fan, since I remember myself).

To put things clear, I believe there are two different ways of beating the current Bayern. Either you try to disrupt their 1st phase of construction and control with the precision of a Swiss clock, the depth of whole team (Distance between the last line and the first man in pressure) plus keeping the ball; or you get lucky, score two goals from set-pieces and then later in the game, you find Bayern out of balance in a defense-attack transition and then score (yes Real Madrid 2013/2014). But even if this in theory, could be a good strategy to beat them, the truth is that Bayern has a variety of solutions, in tactical terms that I dare to say, you do not see in any other team in the World. And if this is not merit of Guardiola then I do not know who the credit should be given to.

In the first leg, Bayern in their first phase of construction used 2 players, Dante and Boateng, plus Xabi Alonso would drop to make a line of 3. In this case it is clear that the movement of Xabi is in fact, the pressing reference for Jackson Martinez (as you see the work of a striker is much more than scoring goals). However the three goals scored on the first leg, could not be considered merit of Lopetegui’s strategy for 2 reasons:

  • The first goal is 50/50, merit of Martinez, plus bad touch of Xabi, plus the referee not to blow the whistle against FC Porto, as the tackle could be easily considered foul; the second and third goal are also individual errors from Dante and Boateng;
  • The action of Martinez is actually individual pressure and not pressing (collective action). He tried to chase a ball that had little chance to steal and create a scoring opportunity.

Taking into account what empirical studies have proven so far (i.e. Carvalhal, Chris Anderson, etc…), football is the game where roughly only half of the times the stronger team wins. For example, games like basketball or baseball, this margin is stretched to values over 60%. This suggests that there are just too many variables to control in the game (some people call it luck), and therefore the coach cannot be responsible for all of them. You may help a player to develop his skills, but this will not eliminate the possibility of a player to have a first bad touch in a game scenario, no matter how hard you train.

You can watch here the first leg highlights which I am referring to.

So what did Guardiola do on the second leg?

Simply took Xabi Alonso out of the 1st phase of construction, started to build up from the back with Rafinha, Boateng and Badstuber and created chaos on pressing references of FC Porto. With this simple tweak, Jackson did not know what to do (should press or retreat), the same goes for the wingers Brahimi and Quaresma, and then combining the space between sectors that Lopetegui’s side left for Bayern to construct plus the individual and collective quality of Bayern did the rest.

They can build up from the back, but if they are under pressure they can also play out of pressure zones with equal effectiveness. And now I wonder, if this is not merit of Guardiola, then who is it? The variables he can control like the game model, how his game principles and ideas articulate, are all there. His work is there for anyone to see, if you bother to look for them. FC Porto and his coach took 45 min to understand these subtle tweaks, and that cost them 5-0 (along with individual mistakes from Fabiano and deflected shots – again external variables). But in my opinion, Guardiola also proved another thing: is that he is a step ahead of almost everyone else (Jorge Jesus implied a year ago something similar) because he answered to a very difficult question to most of the coaches around the world: should one team adapts to the other or keep their principles of play? He showed that the two things can be done at the same time.

Second leg can be watched here

P.S. – Allegri (and 99% of English coaches), is man-marking working well for you? (Here starts at 0:31’’).

by Pedro Castro

pedro castro bnw

You might be interested in

Breaking the Myth: Strikers need to score every game

Published on in Features

harry-kane-tottenham-premier-league_hzmu3zfggzab1l7u5bj7lolva

After starting the “Conceptualising Football” series, I would like to launch the “Breaking the myth” series. It will be composed by few articles covering some “absolute truths” about the game that I personally strongly disagree and hope to show to the readers that perhaps with all modesty, I might be right.

The first episode of this series is based on a conversation I had last week with a Tottenham fan. According to him, Harry Kane should be called up to the National English Team as he has been scoring tons of goals. In his opinion, the only and most important role of the striker is to be there (in his own words – whatever that means) to score. In my opinion this is wrong for various reasons:

  • The act of finishing is just a sub-moment of the game;
  • There is no such thing as unique “specialisation” (on TOP teams);

As it was explained on the previous article “Conceptualising Football”, there are four different moments in the game. Finishing is a sub-moment within the Attacking Organisation Phase, occurring after a defense-attack transition or in detached situations such as free-kicks and set-pieces. I will deliberately ignore free-kicks and set-pieces from the discussion because they are very specific situations. Roberto Carlos and Juninho were two good examples of two great free-kicks specialists, very effective finishers in that specific sub-moment of the game, however they could never be considered to be strong finishers.

In first place, thinking of finishing as a sub-moment of those two main moments of the game and understanding the game of a constant flow of moments interconnected to one another, we arrive to one simple conclusion: the weight of the different actions within the different sub-moments cannot be measurable. How can possibly be said that the action of centre forward who completes a dummy run to attract and drag the center’s back in order to clear up space for an inside run of a winger (sub-moment – building up attacking play), is less important, than the action of scoring (sub-moment – finishing)?

In the case of last weekend’s match between FC Porto and Sporting Lisbon (http://footyroom.com/fc-porto-3-0-sporting-lisbon-2015-03/) should Cristian Tello’s scoring action be considered more important than the heel flick from Jackson Martinez who leaves the three defenders behind the ball and Tello facing the goal 1v1 against the GK?

Secondly, an invaluable lesson that Guardiola’s Barcelona in the past and Bayern Munich in the present, is that football is undeniably moving to an era where the players are becoming less ‘role specialists’ and more of a ‘moments of game specialists’.In other words this means that in top teams, most of the players know what to do in the different moments of the game, depending on their (and their teammates’) momentary position on pitch. All this within a greater collective organisation (Game Model). For the exact same reason, that’s why Lahm can play as a defensive midfielder with Guardiola, when he has played all his career as a full-back. This also supports the assertion that fixed game organisations are less important than the dynamics resulting from players’ interaction.

by Pedro Castro

pedro castro bnw

You might be interested in

The role of analytics in football analysis

Published on in Other

analytics word cloud

Football has been frenetically overwhelmed in the last few years by the need to gather more and more data about games and coaching sessions. From the software (and hardware) that analyse the number of passes, distances covered or average speeds to the behaviours displayed by a coach when delivering a coaching session or in game-context, the sports market is literally flooded with devices and programs that will gather this information within a blink of an eye. With this information in hand, the role of analytics within the football analysis context is therefore to identify patterns within the data and to predict future outcomes. In my perspective, this line of thought may be flawed because numbers are very useful for identifying patterns in football, but their use for explaining and analysing a football game is limited. Let´s look at some basic examples of these limitations:

1- Mascherano holds a better passing percentage than Piqué

Looking at the WhoScored statistics available online, Mascherano roughly played the same time in La Liga as Piqué (857min vs 855min), but holds a considerable difference in average of passes per game (73.3 passes vs 63 passes) and success rate of these passes (91.1% vs 89.7%). Obviously I am interested in analysing the last two items. These numbers show that a player is able to complete more passes with more success than another. We all agree on this. However do these numbers explain why the passes made by Mascherano are more effective than Piqué’s? Probably not. And why is that? In my opinion, this is because one can analyse the number of passes and the success rate, but one cannot  determine whether each pass was the best decision possible.

After years of making descriptive analysis of Barcelona games, I am able to conclude that Piqué risks the vertical pass more often than Mascherano, who most of the time plays the safest pass (backwards or sideways).

2- They should have bought Darren Bent

This is the title of the third chapter of a book called The numbers game: Why everything you know about football is wrong, by Chris Anderson and David Sally. I am usually highly skeptical of books with this kind of title, as they give the impression that one is about to witness the power of absolute truth once one understands what the authors are trying to prove. In this chapter the authors make an obvious point from statistical analysis: not every goal has the same value, as some goals when scored secure points and others don´t (i.e. 0-0 to 1-0 = 3 points; 1-0 to 1-1 = 1 point; 5-0 to 5-1 = 0 points).

Starting from this premise, the authors tried to prove that Darren Bent would be the best option available (for Liverpool to replace Torres, instead of Andy Carroll), taking into account his record of marginal points, or in simple terms the number of points that his team achieved as a direct result of the goals scored by Darren Bent. In fact Darren Bent throughout the 2009/2010 and 2010/2011 campaigns ranked second in marginal points table behind Rooney (2009/2010) and Tevez (2010/2011), who respectively had 20.02 points (scored 24 goals) and 15.01 points (scored 17 goals). During these two seasons, Bent played for two different clubs, Sunderland and Aston Villa.

In my perspective this argument based on the use of marginal points as a predictor of whether a new signing is best for a squad is fallacious. In first place it could be argued that the reason why Darren Bent scored so many marginal points is due to the fact that he played for mid/low-table teams, with a typical British tactical approach. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, is the consideration that the analytical method loses sight of the importance of the game model of each team. In simple terms, what is the point of buying a player who is unable to understand or does not have the characteristics to play in a specific way?

Two good examples of this can be presently seen in Spain: Diego Costa playing for the Spanish National Team and Suárez playing for FC Barcelona. Both players are unable to fit in a game model based on possession, mobility, playing between lines, use of all corridors, simple combinations, etc, simply because that model requires players who have the ability to pass and read the game quickly and especially are able to take the best decision possible.

Without numbers, I daresay that most of the times for Costa and Suárez the best decision is always to fight hard against the defenders, run like there is no tomorrow, fight for every ball as if the world is about to collapse and try to score no matter what. Also without numbers, I daresay that last season Suárez must have contributed with plenty of marginal points to Liverpool´s campaign.

However this season at FC Barcelona, it is clear that Suárez has nothing in common with his teammates in terms of how they perceive the game or in terms of decision-making skills. Therefore going back to the main question here, my opinion is that neither Carroll or Bent were the best options to replace Torres, but someone who would have similar characteristics to Torres (i.e. Lewandowski, Benzema or Jackson Martinez).

In closing, I think that it is quite clear that the analytics as a method per se is quite limited, as demonstrated with these two simple examples, but this is not to say that it is completely useless. I maintain that when used as a complement of descriptive analysis it could be a strong tool to enhance the Scouting Division of any club. Nonetheless whoever is responsible for the analysis should have a deep knowledge of the game, especially to identify the process of decision making, instead of just looking for patterns of play or statistics that only show a superficial perspective of the game.

by Pedro Castro

pedro castro bnw

Go to Top